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1. Harper v. Virginia Board Of Elections  (PDF 98KB)U.S. Supreme Court, 83 U.S. 663 March 24, 1966 |
Harper and co-defendants filed suit against the state of Virginia, alleging it was a violation of the U.S. Constitution for the state to require payment of state-imposed voting taxes (aka "poll tax," designated to pay for "services") prior to voting.
The District
court dismissed the case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in favor of Harper et al., noting that
voter qualifications have nothing to do with wealth or paying taxes or
fees.
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"Held: A State's conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
...
While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. 1, 2, of the Constitution, the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned... For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
We conclude that a State violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
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| 2. Otsuka v. Hite (PDF 164KB) California Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 594 May 24, 1966 |
Katsuki James Otsuka, et al., filed a Class Action suit against the California Registrar of
Voters, Benjamin S. Hite, etc., for refusing to register them
to vote due to their prior convictions as conscientious objectors. The refusal to register the plaintiffs to vote was based on California's constitution barring voters convicted of "infamous crimes."
The California Superior Court ruled that Otsuka et al. should be permitted to register to vote, and that California's list of "infamous crimes" was too broad, and should be narrowed to "moral corruption and dishonesty." As a result of this case all California counties attempted to bar from voting those convicted of "moral corruption and dishonesty." |
"After reviewing the history and purpose of this
ground of voter disqualifications we have concluded that to preserve its
constitutionality it must be limited to conviction of crimes involving
moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding their perpetrator a
threat to the integrity of the elective process. Plaintiffs' crime was not
'infamous' as thus construed, and hence the judgment is reversed....
In ruling on the validity of state-imposed restrictions on this fundamental right the United States Supreme Court has in effect tended to apply the principle that the state must show it has a compelling interest in abridging the right, and that in any event such restrictions must be drawn with narrow specificity....
Viewed in this
light, serious constitutional difficulties appear when the disfranchising
provision of article II, section 1, is applied to these plaintiffs." |
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COURT RULING EXCERPTS |
| 4. Richardson v. Ramirez (PDF 164KB) U.S. Supreme Court, 418 U.S. 24 June 24, 1974 |
Ramirez, Lee, and Gill were
denied the ability to register to vote in three California
counties after completing their felony sentences. They filed suit against
the California Secretary of State and other election officials, including
Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County. California election officials relented and registered Ramirez et al. to vote. However, the case had been certified as a class action lawsuit that would effect all felons in California and was therefore permitted to continue through the courts. The California Supreme Court ruled that the state's felon disenfranchisement law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that California's felon disenfranchisement law was constitutionally permissible.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court
found California's felon disenfranchisement clause to be constitutional, the
California state legislature amended its constitution on Nov. 5, 1974 to limit
disenfranchisement to those people convicted of crimes when
"imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony." |
"Pressed upon us by
the respondents, and by amici
curiae, are contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the more
modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the
ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully
participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his term. We
would by no means discount these arguments if addressed to the legislative
forum which may properly weigh and balance them against those advanced in
support of California's present constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come around to that view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument ...
It is argued that disenfranchisement is necessary to prevent vote frauds. Although the State has a legitimate and, in fact, compelling interest in preventing election fraud, the challenged provision is not sustainable on that ground. First, the disenfranchisement provisions are patently both overinclusive and underinclusive. The provision is not limited to those who have demonstrated a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election laws. Rather, it encompasses all former felons and there has been no showing that ex-felons generally are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder of the population." |
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| 5. City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden (PDF 341KB) U.S. Supreme Court, 446 U.S. 55 April 22, 1980 |
Bolden et al. filed a class action lawsuit in Federal District Court, alleging that "the practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments" of the U.S. Constitution.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals (5th District) agreed with Bolden. The case was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that there must be "purposeful discrimination" for a voting disenfranchisement law to be found unconstitutional. Racial discrimination alone is irrelevant unless it can be shown that the intent was to racially discriminate. This case set one of the benchmarks for future cases challenging felon disenfranchisement laws based upon racial intent. |
"Only if there is purposeful discrimination can there
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. And this principle applies
to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to
other claims of racial discrimination. ...
Disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to
establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution. Where the
character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race ...
disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look to
other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose."
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| 6. Hunter v. Underwood (PDF 28KB) U.S. Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 222 April 16, 1985 |
Victor Underwood, described in court documents as
"a white," and Carmen Edwards, "a black," had been blocked from voting
in Alabama because they each had been convicted of "presenting a
worthless check ... a crime involving moral turpitude." They filed
a class action lawsuit, claiming the disenfranchisement was intended to discriminate against blacks.
The District Court ruled against them. The Court
of Appeals (11th Circuit) reversed, saying the provision "would not have
been adopted in the absence of the racially discriminatory motivation."
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, finding that the disenfranchisement
provision "violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." |
"Held: Section 182 [of the Alabama constitution of 1901] violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments ... That 182 may have been adopted to discriminate against poor whites as well as against blacks would not render nugatory [worthless, futile] the purpose to discriminate against blacks...
The drafters [of Section 182] retained the
general felony provision - 'any crime punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary' - but also added a new catchall provision covering
'any...crime involving moral turpitude.' ... It is alleged, and the
Court of Appeals found, that the crimes selected for inclusion in 182 were
believed by the delegates to be more frequently committed by blacks." |
| LEGAL CASE | CASE SUMMARY |
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| 7. Farrakhan v. Washington (PDF 109KB) 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 01-35032 July 25, 2003 |
Muhammad Farrakhan, Marcus Price, Ramon Barrientes, Tim Schaaf, Clifton Briceno, and Al-Kareem Shadeed, all U.S. citizens residing in Washington, were all convicted of felonies. They were subsequently barred from voting in Washington. They claimed in a suit filed against the state that Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme "constitutes improper race-based vote denial in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."
The State argued that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to felons. The district court disagreed, stating it does apply, but ruled against Farrakhan et al. , stating that evidence presented of racial bias in Washington's judicial system could not be used in determining this case. The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals agreed that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was applicable to felons, but said "the district court misconstrued the causation requirement of a Section 2 analysis." The 9th Circuit Court also concluded that Farrakhan et al. were denied the right to vote because of the restoration process and because they had not satisfied all requirements of their sentence. They sent the case back to the district court to further argue the merits. However, before that could occur the State filed an appeal of this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court (Locke v. Farrakhan , No. 03-1597). The lower court action is currently on hold until the U.S. Supreme Court accepts or rejects the case, which it has not yet done as of Aug. 9, 2007. |
"Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] provides that a voting practice or procedure violates the VRA when a plaintiff is able to show, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the challenged voting practice results in discrimination on account of race. ...
Certainly, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged voter qualification denies or abridges their right to vote on account of race, but the 1982 Amendments and subsequent case law make clear that factors outside the election system can contribute to a particular voting practice's disparate impact when those factors involve race discrimination. ...
Therefore ... a causal connection may be shown where the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances." |
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| 8. Madison v. Washington (PDF 158KB) Washington's Supreme Court, 78598-8 July 26, 2007 |
Daniel Madison, Beverly Dubois, and Dannielle Garner, convicted felons, filed suit against the state of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of Washington's disenfranchisement law, claiming it denies the right to vote to convicted felons who have not completed all the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their legal financial obligations (LFOs).
All convicted felons in this case had completed
all of their sentences except for the payment of LFOs. They had payment
plans established, which were current and still owed (approximately, with interest) as follows:
Madison et al. felt that Washington's requirement that all LFOs must be paid in full prior to their sentence being considered "complete" was biased against the poor. Washington's Supreme Court disagreed, opining that as long as all felons were treated in the same way the law could not be considered biased. |
"We hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The privileges and immunities clause does reflect, in part, our framers' concerns with 'undue political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealth' and 'avoiding favoritism toward the wealthy.' However, such concerns are not triggered by Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme because it grants the 'privilege' of restoration of voting rights 'upon the same terms . . . equally . . . to all citizens.'
The Washington Constitution grants the right to vote to all Washington citizens on equal terms. Additionally, the Washington Constitution disqualifies voters on equal terms -- that is, when individuals have been convicted of committing a felony. ... The system of only restoring voting rights to felons who have satisfied all of the terms of their sentences, including fully paying their LFOs, does not constitute a grant of favoritism or a granting of a privilege on unequal terms ... because the same standard is applied evenly to all felons seeking restoration of their voting rights." |
